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Abstract: 
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to review research on litigation 
in corporate finance. 
Design/methodology/approach: This paper surveys studies on the 
estimation of litigation risk, litigation costs, stock reaction to lawsuit 
announcement, and the effect of litigation on corporate financial 
policies and outcomes. 
Findings: The first section presents a survey of studies that estimate 
litigation risk. The authors then discuss a set of studies that focus on 
the various costs associated with litigation. The third area of review is 
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about studies which estimate the market reaction to a lawsuit 
announcement. The next section surveys studies that examine the 
relation between litigation and a variety of corporate policies, 
behaviors, and outcomes. The authors then discuss the emerging 
literature on how corporate political connections can influence the 
outcome of litigation. The survey concludes with a brief summary and 
a discussion of suggestions for future research involving corporate 
litigation. 
Originality/value: By providing an extensive review of the literature 
on litigation in corporate finance, this survey can help researchers to 
identify recent trends in litigation research and select promising new 
avenues of investigation in the field. 
Keywords: Corporate finance, Litigation 
 
1. Introduction 
While corporate litigation has always been present in the 
corporate environment, it has lately evolved into a major source of risk 
to the firm. Despite the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), which was designed to curb frivolous 
lawsuits, the number of corporate lawsuits has increased by more than 
50 percent and corporate litigation costs have more than doubled over 
the past decade.1 The total amount of settlements in class action 
security lawsuits has increased from $150 million in 1997 to $9.7 
billion in 2005 (Zingales, 2007). As litigation risk and costs have 
increased, the study of their effects on firm value and activities has 
become more critical than ever. 
Litigation in corporate finance is of great interest and worthy of 
investigation largely because its cost-benefit trade-off for the firm 
stakeholders is unclear. While litigation costs are significant, 
settlement amounts in some cases provide only payments of 
attorney’s fees and do not generate any direct benefit to plaintiff 
stakeholders (Romano, 1991). Many lawsuits, however, have a 
beneficial role because, by imposing monetary and reputational costs 
to the firm, provide external disciplining of managers and can help to 
reduce agency problems within the firm (Becht et al., 2003). 
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While a few studies on the costs of corporate litigation and the 
effect of lawsuits on firm value began to appear in the academic press 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the creation of the Class Action 
Security Lawsuit Database in the late 1990s and the Audit Analytics 
Litigation Database in the 2000s allowed the generation of a large 
number of empirical studies of the effects of litigation in corporate 
finance. In this literature survey, we provide a review of the litigation 
literature in corporate finance organized by different topic areas. 
Section 2 presents a survey of studies that estimate litigation risk. 
Section 3 discusses a set of studies that focus on the costs associated 
with litigation. Section 4 reviews event studies on the market reaction 
to the announcement of lawsuits. Section 5 surveys studies that 
examine the relation between litigation and a variety of corporate 
policies, behaviors, and outcomes. Section 6 discusses the emerging 
literature on how corporate political connections can influence the 
outcome of litigation. Section 7 concludes with a brief summary and a 
discussion of future areas of research involving corporate litigation. 
2. Determinants and estimation of litigation risk 
One of the most common measures of litigation risk is an ex 
ante proxy set as an indicator variable equal to one for firms becoming 
defendant of a lawsuit in the following year and zero otherwise (e.g. 
Lowry and Shu, 2002; Field et al., 2005; Arena and Julio, 2015). By 
analyzing firms during the fiscal year preceding the lawsuit filing, this 
litigation risk dummy provides a proxy of ex ante litigation risk and 
can be used to pursue two different research tracks. The first is to 
build predictive models of corporate litigation while the second is ex 
post in nature and seeks to explain why firms are sued. 
A large component of litigation risk for corporations is industry 
based. Francis et al. (1994a, b), find that firms in the biotechnology, 
computers, electronics, and retail industries had the highest incidence 
of litigation between 1988 and 1992. They create a proxy of litigation 
risk as an indicator variable based on affiliation in these four industries 
using SIC codes. Several studies use this simple industry indicator as 
proxy for litigation risk (i.e. Ali and Kallapur, 2001; Johnson et al., 
2000a, 2001, 2007). Chandra et al. (2004) and Choi (2006) uses a 
variation of this litigation proxy by excluding retail firms and restricting 
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their analysis to firms belonging to the three high technology 
industries used by Francis et al. (1994a, b) (i.e. computer hardware, 
computer software, and pharmaceuticals). Kim and Skinner (2012), 
however, show that these industry measures of litigation risk have low 
predictive power. They find that while litigation tends to cluster in 
certain industries, the set of industries varies over time. 
As shown by Kim and Skinner (2012), the addition of firm 
characteristics to an industry indicator significantly increases the 
predictive power of future lawsuits. This more sophisticated measure 
of litigation risk, which includes firm-specific and in some cases 
industry-wide factors, is the product of logit or probit regression 
models of litigation. These models use the predicted probabilities 
generated by a binary choice regression as measure of litigation risk. 
The explanatory variables of these regressions consist of firm 
characteristics that are related to the incidence of litigation. Typical 
variables of these models are market capitalization, stock returns, 
stock volatility, and stock turnover as well as industry indicator 
variables consistent with Francis et al. (1994a, b). Market capitalization 
is related to the risk of litigation as larger companies are more likely to 
settle with higher payments to plaintiffs. This makes them more 
attractive as targets for lawsuits. Stock performance variables are 
related to the incidence of security class action lawsuits since such 
suits are often triggered by large stock price declines, high stock 
volatility, or excessive turnover surrounding the period of the alleged 
fraud (Alexander, 1991; Jones and Weingram, 1996; Skinner, 1997; 
Dyl, 1999; Simmons and Hoyt, 1993; Gande and Lewis, 2009). 
Studies such as Johnson et al. (2000a) and Johnson et al. 
(2007) include additional explanatory variables such as stock beta, 
return skewness, insider trading, external financing, CEO power, and 
management monitoring. Insider trading and high external financing 
activity might be used to exploit high stock valuation obtained through 
misleading releases of information, activities that increase the risk of 
litigation (Brown et al., 2005). Dechow et al. (1996) include a CEO 
power variable because CEOs with greater power are more likely to 
engage in the opportunistic behaviors that can trigger litigation. 
Better monitoring of management and stronger corporate 
governance can reduce the incidence of litigation. Daines et al. (2010) 
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include corporate governance and transparency ratings variables, but 
fail to find these variables having predictive power for litigation. Kim 
and Skinner (2012) show that corporate governance and managerial 
opportunism variables do not significantly add to the predictive ability 
of binary choice regression models of litigation risk. 
A few studies analyze the influence of earnings manipulation 
and disclosure quality on litigation risk. Firms that manipulate earnings 
upward prior to stock issues are more vulnerable to litigation 
(DuCharme et al., 2004). The incentive compensation mix for 
executives has also an effect on litigation risk by increasing the 
probability of earnings manipulation (Peng and Roell, 2008). 
Companies that issue earning warnings are in certain cases able to 
deter lawsuits (Field et al., 2005). 
Brown et al. (2005) and Rogers and Stocken (2005) include 
industry dummies to their litigation probability model in addition to 
many of the variables mentioned above. Predictive models that include 
firm characteristics with industry indicator variables are the most 
complete and offer the stronger predictive power (Kim and Skinner, 
2012). 
Recently, the literature on litigation risk has begun investigating 
the role of behavioral factors on lawsuit initiations. Hutton et al. 
(2015) find that firms with opposing political values face different 
types of lawsuits. Republican-leaning firms are more likely to be 
exposed to labor, civil rights, and environmental lawsuits, while 
Democratic-leaning firms are more likely to be exposed to securities 
and intellectual property lawsuits. Banerjee et al. (2016) find that 
executive overconfidence increases the likelihood of securities class 
action lawsuits. 
Adhikari et al. (2016) report that firms with female executives 
experience lower litigation risk. 
Directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance coverage 
provides an alternative proxy for litigation risk. Companies purchase 
D&O liability insurance to provide personal coverage and corporate 
reimbursement if a claim is settled with no admission of bad faith or 
there is no finding of bad faith in court. One advantage of this proxy is 
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that it is able to capture litigation risk for firms that successfully avoid 
litigation even though they might be highly exposed to the risk of a 
lawsuit. Unfortunately, data on D&O insurance for US firms are not 
publicly available and only a few studies have been able to use this 
proxy of litigation risk in relation to corporate governance, the quality 
of financial reporting and earnings forecasts (i.e. Baker and Griffith, 
2007; Cao and Narayanamoorthy, 2011, 2014). 
While there is extensive research on litigation risk factors in the 
USA, little is known about litigation risk at the international level. 
Arena and Ferris (2016) explore factors that affect litigation risk 
around the world and find that defendant firms headquartered in civil 
law countries and in countries with less efficient legal and judiciary 
systems face lower litigation risk. Unlike US-centric litigation risk 
studies, Arena and Ferris (2016) do not find a significant relation 
between stock turnover, cumulative returns, and the probability to be 
sued. 
3. Litigation costs 
Lawsuits often result into significant costs for the sued firms. 
Corporate lawsuits have significant direct costs with large negative 
effects on profitability, cash holdings, and firm value. The direct costs 
consist of settlement disbursements or damages and legal fees. Some 
of the direct costs of litigation are defrayed by litigation insurance. 
Almost all US publicly traded firms buy personal coverage insurance 
(A-side insurance) and corporate reimbursement coverage insurance 
for director and executive indemnification reimbursement (B-side 
insurance). Many firms also purchase optional entity securities 
coverage (C-side insurance) which provides protection to the 
corporation from its own liability. C-side litigation insurance, however, 
frequently does not provide full coverage. According to the 1996-2006 
Towers Perrin D&O Liability Surveys, publicly traded firms have an 
average litigation insurance limit of about $15 million. This amount 
only covers about 26 percent of the average settlement disbursement 
reported by Arena and Julio (2015) for their sample in the same period 
($56 million).2 Settlement amounts are positively related to the 
severity of the case (Cox and Thomas, 2004) and the magnitude of 
shareholder losses (Karpoff et al., 2008a). Securities class actions with 
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institutional owners as lead plaintiffs have larger monetary settlements 
than lawsuits with individual lead plaintiffs (Cheng et al., 2010). 
Before the PSLRA of 1995, 20 percent of the cases resolved into 
settlements that exceeded 10 percent of the firm’s annual revenues 
(Skinner, 1997). Cutler and Summers (1988) examine the 
Pennzoil/Texaco lawsuit and find significant costs associate with the 
lawsuit, with the losses for Texaco being larger than the gains for 
Pennzoil. 
They find that the combined decline in value for the two firms is 
about $2 billion and attribute the majority of this drop to an increase 
in the costs of financial distress for Texaco. Engelmann and Cornell 
(1988) study the wealth implications around filings, verdicts, and 
settlements for a sample of five interfirm lawsuits. They also observe 
combined wealth losses for the litigating firms. 
On December 22, 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which added Section 27(a)(3) to the 
Securities Act of 1933 and Section 21D(a)(3) to the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. This act added obstacles to securities fraud 
class action lawsuits to reduce the incidence of frivolous litigation. The 
new rules include a revised lead plaintiff appointment process, the 
prohibition of bonus payments to lead plaintiffs, the reduction of 
attorneys’ fees to a “reasonable percentage” of any damage award, 
the comprehensive disclosure of the provisions of settlement and 
attorney’s fees, the change from “joint and several liabilities” to 
“proportionate liability,” a higher pleading standard to increase the 
cost of lawsuits; and a 90-day “bounce back” rule to prevents case 
from rushing into courts. Grundfest and Perino (1997) find that 
number of class action security decreased by about 16 percent the 
year of the Act compared to the year before. Bajaj et al. (2014) report 
that even though the number of state cases increased between 1995 
and 1996, the number of total cases declined by 25 percent due to a 
drop of about 35 percent in the number of federal cases during the 
same period. Perino (2003) extends the analysis up to 2001 and 
obtain results consistent with previous researchers. Ferris and 
Pritchard (2001) and Johnson et al. (2007) determine that the PSLRA 
has significantly decreased the number of frivolous shareholder 
lawsuits in the years following the enactment of the act. As we note in 
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the introduction to this survey, however, after an initial decline, the 
number of lawsuits has resumed its growth. Moreover, settlement 
costs have not decreased following the passage of the Reform Act 
(Karpoff et al., 2008a). 
In addition to settlement disbursements and attorney’s fees, 
firms sustain indirect litigation costs that in most circumstances have a 
stronger detrimental effect on shareholder and debtholder value than 
direct costs. Indirect costs include loss of firm’s credibility, increase in 
the perceived uncertainty about a firm’s prospects, loss of customers 
and suppliers, and diversion of manages’ time and resources (Karpoff 
and Lott, 1993, 1999; Phillips and Miller, 1996; Johnson et al., 
2000a,b; Black et al., 2006). As discussed by Klein and Leffler (1981) 
and Jarrell and Peltzman (1985), the revelation of misconduct have 
significant effects on corporate costs and operations. Overall, direct 
and indirect costs greatly exceed the expected befits accrued to the 
plaintiffs (Engelmann and Cornell, 1988). 
Karpoff et al. (2008a) estimate the reputational losses sustained 
by firms prosecuted for financial misrepresentation by using a modified 
version of the empirical procedure introduced by Peltzman (1981). 
They find that the reputation loss exceeds the legal penalty by more 
than 7.5 times. The reputation loss is larger for firms that rely more on 
implicit contracts (e.g. firms with larger R&D expenditures and 
intangible assets) consistent with Klein and Leffler (1981) and Landes 
and Posner (1987). Murphy et al. (2009) empirically show that losses 
in market value upon revelation of corporate misconduct are partially 
due to higher firm risk and lower future profitability. 
4. Stock market reaction at the time of lawsuit 
filings 
The earliest law and finance studies concerning corporate 
litigation focus on the stock price reaction of defendant firms at 
specific times during the lawsuit process. Ellert (1976) examines the 
market reaction to announcements of legal challenges to mergers by 
the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice in the 
1950s and 1960s. He finds that, in the month following the lawsuit 
filing, the defendant firm’s stock price declines on average by 2 
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percent. Fischel and Bradley (1986) analyze the stock price reaction at 
the time of a judgement on management motions to dismiss in 
derivative suits and discovers a significantly negative return when 
lawsuits are dismissed. This suggests that the market views derivative 
lawsuits positively. Romano (1991) presents the first event study on 
lawsuit filings focusing on a random sample of publicly traded firms 
sued between 1966 and 1987. She does not observe any significant 
abnormal returns for lawsuit initiations. 
Subsequent evidence, however, consistently shows that the 
stock market reacts negatively to the filing of corporate lawsuits. 
Karpoff and Lott (1993) explore a sample of corporate defendants 
accused of fraud. They determine that such firms sustain significant 
market losses at the announcement of the accusation. The authors 
attribute most of this stock price decline to reputation costs. Bhagat et 
al. (1994) perform an event study on interfirm litigation, lawsuits in 
which both the plaintiff and the defendant are corporations. They find 
joint wealth losses at the time of the lawsuit filing and show that these 
stock price declines are mainly due to an increased probability of 
financial distress for the defendant firm. In a subsequent study, Bizjak 
and Coles (1995) focus on a subset of interim lawsuits (i.e. private 
antitrust suits). They determine that joint wealth effects at the time of 
the lawsuit filing are negative. They further explain that the decline in 
the stock price in antitrust disputes are attributable to the expectation 
of court restrictions on the defendant’s business practices and the 
likelihood of additional suits and financial distress. Bizjak and Coles 
(1995) also find a positive stock market reaction for plaintiff firms 
upon at the time of the lawsuit initiation. 
Bhagat et al. (1998) examine the wealth effects of all types of 
corporate lawsuits filed between 1981 and 1983. They report that 
regardless of the identity of the entity or individual that brought the 
lawsuit against a firm (i.e. government entity, another firm, or a 
private citizen), the defendant firm’s stock price experiences a 
statistically significant decline upon the lawsuit filing. 
Gande and Lewis (2009) examine a comprehensive sample of 
security class action lawsuits filed between 1996 and 2003 and confirm 
significantly negative stock price reactions at the announcement. They 
also find that shareholders partially anticipate these lawsuits based on 
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lawsuits against other firms in the same industry and capitalize some 
of these losses prior to the lawsuit filing date. Klock (2015) 
investigates a sample of class action lawsuits between 1995 (the year 
of the enactment of the PSLRA) and 2012 and obtains results 
consistent with those of Gande and Lewis (2009). 
Bhattacharya et al. (2007) study the stock market reaction to 
lawsuit filings for non-US firms sued in US courts. They find that non-
US firms sustain larger stock market losses at the announcement, 
which is a rational adjustment to their higher probability to lose in 
comparison to US defendant firms. 
5. The effect of litigation on corporate behavior, 
decisions, and outcomes 
Litigation risk and lawsuits have significant long-lasting effects 
on the defendant firm, its executives and directors. The law and 
finance literature provides an extensive examination of the 
ramification of corporate litigation on a large number of corporate 
activities, policies, behaviors, and outcomes such as equity issuance 
and IPO underpricing, debt financing, cost of capital, corporate 
governance, investment decisions, and insider trading. In the following 
sections we survey studies in each of these areas. 
5.1 Equity issuance and IPO underpricing 
The Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 provides shareholders the 
right to sue a firm going public (i.e. an IPO) for material 
misstatements or omissions. The great majority of IPO lawsuits 
against the issuing firms are brought under Sections 11 and 12 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 
(Lowry and Shu, 2002). Under Section 11, damages for direct 
purchasers of IPO stocks depend on the difference between the offer 
price and either the sale price or the security’s price at the time of the 
lawsuit. Aftermarket purchasers can also sue the IPO firm if they can 
demonstrate that they relied on the prospectus to make their 
purchasing decision. Because damages are directly related to the offer 
price, a firm that underprices its IPO more aggressively has lower 
potential damages and a decreased probability of being sued. A 
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possible motivation for IPO underpricing is, therefore, to reduce 
litigation risk.3 
Litigation risk is one of the main long-standing explanations of 
underpricing along with the signaling and information asymmetry 
hypotheses. Ibbotson (1975) is the first to posit that IPO firms 
underprice their shares to protect themselves from the risk of 
litigation. Tinic (1988) formulates a model of the expected cost of legal 
liabilities as a function of the difference between the offer price and 
the post-offer price. Hughes and Thakor (1992) further develop Tinic’s 
model in a game-theory setting and specify the conditions to reach 
equilibrium in underpricing. Hensler (1995) offers another variation of 
Tinic’s theory by developing a utility maximization singleperiod model. 
Several empirical studies test these theoretical models. Tinic 
(1988) compares underpricing before the 1933 Securities Act (i.e. 
1923-1930) with underpricing after the enactment of the Act (i.e. 
1966-1970). He discovers that underpricing is significantly higher in 
the later period which is consistent with the litigation risk hypothesis of 
underpricing. Drake and Vetsuypens (1993), however, report that the 
average initial returns between 1972 and 1977 are actually lower than 
those before 1933. They argue that Tinic’s results might be driven by 
factors other than litigation risk. Keloharju (1993) test different 
underpricing hypotheses in the Finnish stock market. He finds a mean 
underpricing of 8.7 percent, which is significantly lower than that for 
US IPO firms during the same period. He concludes that, because IPO 
litigation in Finland is virtually non-existent, the difference in 
underpricing can be at least partially explained by litigation risk. Drake 
and Vetsuypens (1993) find that IPO firms with positive initial returns 
are more likely to be sued than firms with negative returns. Even 
though their result is inconsistent with the litigation risk hypothesis, 
the validity of their conclusion is challenged by potential endogeneity.4 
Lowry and Shu (2002) use a simultaneous equation model to control 
for the endogeneity between litigation risk and underpricing that 
affected previous studies. Their results show that underpricing has 
both an insurance and a deterrence effect on litigation. Firms with 
higher litigation risk underprice their IPOs more to reduce the risk of 
being sued and a more pronounced underpricing reduces expected 
litigation costs. 
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Following the bust of the internet bubble in the early 2000s, a 
multitude of IPO allocation lawsuits were filed in the Southern District 
Court of New York against investment banks that underwrote IPOs in 
the previous three years. Zhu (2009) analyses 259 IPO allocation 
cases involving 28 percent of the 906 firms that went public between 
1998 and 2000. Unlike traditional Section 11 IPO lawsuits, allocation 
lawsuits charge underwriters for an excessive increase in aftermarket 
prices. IPOs with higher underpricing, therefore, are more likely to 
trigger allocation lawsuits. Zhu (2009) finds that, because the 
predominance of this type of IPO lawsuits in the early 2000s, deeper 
underpricing did not reduce litigation risk during that specific period. 
Hao (2011) does not observe firms with higher litigation risk 
underpricing their IPOs more during her sample period of 1995-2005. 
She finds, however, that firms which are more likely to withdraw their 
offerings face higher litigation risk if they complete the IPO. Further, 
she reports that firms with higher litigation risk pay a higher gross 
spread to their underwriters. Walker et al. (2015) posit that plaintiffs 
of IPO lawsuits manifest opportunistic behavior. They find that the 
main predictors of litigation and settlement amounts are the monetary 
damages that plaintiffs can claim and the remaining wealth available in 
the firm. Hanley and Hoberg (2012) perform a word content analysis 
on IPO prospectuses and find a trade-off between underpricing and 
disclosure as hedges against litigation. While strong disclosure is an 
effective hedge against all types of IPO lawsuits, underpricing is 
effective mainly in preventing Section 11 litigation. Ferris et al. (2013) 
use textual analysis to examine the incidence of conservatism in a set 
of IPO prospectuses over 1999-2005. They determine that auditor 
stature is positively related to prospectus conservatism. They conclude 
that more reputable auditors tend to encourage issuer conservatism, 
perhaps in response to reputation concerns and concern over legal 
liability. 
Recently researchers have begun to analyze the relation 
between litigation risk and IPO underpricing at the international level 
using a cross-country framework. Banerjee et al. (2011) and Lin et al. 
(2013), consistent with the litigation risk hypothesis of underpricing, 
find that higher litigation risk in a specific country the larger is 
associated with greater underpricing of the IPOs in that country. 
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5.2 Cost of capital 
Due to its significant direct and indirect costs, corporate 
litigation has an important effect on the defendant firm’s cost of 
capital. Firms that are subject to accounting enforcement actions by 
the SEC experience a significant increase in their cost of capital 
(Dechow et al., 1996). Following a lawsuit filing or revelation of 
corporate misconduct, the defendant firm’s stock tends to experience 
an increase in idiosyncratic volatility. This has a consequent effect on 
the firm’s cost of capital (Murphy et al., 2009). Chava et al. (2010) 
report that, at the time of a filing of a class action lawsuit, the 
defendant firm’s cost of equity capital significantly increases and that 
this increase is incremental over the effect of the disclosure 
announcement. They also find that accounting fraud lawsuits and 
lawsuits with high merit have a stronger effect on cost of capital. 
Both at the time when firms experience litigation risk and after 
the filing of a litigation, firms sustain higher interest on their bank 
loans. Banks price litigation risk in loan contracting by charging a 
higher spread, offering shorter maturity loan, or loans with more 
covenants to firms with higher likelihood to be sued (Yuan and Zhang, 
2015). Following the filing of a class action security lawsuit, defendant 
firms experience an increase in loan spreads, higher up-front 
borrowing charges, and more financial covenants and collateral 
requirements (Deng et al., 2014). When corporate directors are more 
insulated from potential litigation due to limited liability and 
indemnification provisions, firms benefit from higher credit ratings and 
lower yield spreads (Bradley and Chen, 2011). 
5.3 Corporate financial policies 
Recently the finance literature has started investigating the 
effect of litigation on corporate financial policies. Corporate managers 
are likely to manage expected future litigation costs by modifying 
financial policies. Arena and Julio (2015) find that firms significantly 
increase the level of their cash holdings in anticipation of lawsuits. The 
market value of cash is significantly lower for firms exposed to 
litigation risk. One mechanism through which firms accumulate cash is 
by reducing corporate investments. Conversely, firms that overinvest 
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are more likely to get sued (McTier and Wald, 2011). Firms with a 
higher risk of costly lawsuits are more likely to undertake aggressive 
growth through acquisitions to diversify their risk (Gormley and Matsa, 
2011). 
The full implications of litigation on firm value and liquidity are 
only known at the time of the lawsuit resolution. Firms, therefore, are 
likely to further adjust financial policies at the time of a lawsuit 
settlement. Arena and Julio (2016) show that firms set their pay out 
policy based on the perceived litigation risk and then change their 
share repurchase policy once the lawsuit is resolved. Firms that face 
significant litigation risk pay lower dividends or omit dividends while 
distributing more cash through share repurchase programs. This 
increase in pay out flexibility allows firms to more easily decrease cash 
distributions to shareholders if anticipated litigation expenses are 
subsequently incurred. McTier and Wald (2011) also find that firms 
reduce pay outs following a lawsuit. In addition firms are likely to 
reduce overinvestment activity, cash holdings, and diversification post-
suit. Autore et al. (2014) discover that firms tend also to reduce their 
reliance on debt and equity financing following severe litigation 
episodes. 
5.4 Financial reporting 
The accounting literature has extensively explored the effect of 
litigation on financial reporting and disclosure. We report a brief 
overview of the main studies on this issue due to the important 
influence that financial reporting has on many corporate financial 
decisions and outcomes. 
The early empirical evidence on the effect of financial disclosure 
and litigation risk is mixed. While Skinner (1994) states that voluntary 
earnings releases can decrease the risk of litigation, Francis et al. 
(1994a, b) determine that early disclosure increases a firm’s legal 
exposure. 
There are several reasons why earnings warnings can reduce 
the probability of a lawsuit. Timely disclosure reduces the time the 
stock trades at inflated prices, which in turn leads to a reduced 
incentive for plaintiffs to sue or lower settlements. Early disclosure 
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weakens the claim that the firm withheld information and can also 
decrease contingent lawsuit loss (Skinner, 1994, 1997). Francis et al. 
(1994a, b), however, empirically observe that earnings warnings are 
likely to be followed by class action securities lawsuits. Their results, 
however, have been received with scepticism due to possible 
endogeneity. Firms with bad news are concurrently likely to disclose 
them and to be sued. The spurious relation between disclosure and 
lawsuits has the effect of concealing the lawsuit deterrence effect of 
disclosure (Skinner, 1997; Field et al., 2005). Field et al. (2005) 
employ a simultaneous equations method and find that disclosure 
deters litigation rather than triggering it. By employing a new measure 
of the timeliness of earnings news, Donelson et al. (2012) obtain 
similar results. After the resolution of a lawsuit, defendant firms tend 
to reduce the level of information disclosed to investors (Johnson et 
al., 2001; Rogers and Van Buskirk, 2009). Rogers et al. (2011) 
examine the tone of disclosure through a textual analysis and find that 
companies which are unusually optimistic in their earnings 
announcements or in which managers engage in abnormal selling are 
more likely to be targets of lawsuits. 
5.5 Corporate governance 
Litigation has also a significant effect on internal governance 
mechanisms. Romano (1991) finds that managerial turnover is more 
frequent for firms involved in litigation. While Agrawal et al. (1999) 
and Helland (2006) do not find unusual turnover among executives 
and directors of firms charged with fraud, Niehaus and Roth (1999) 
show that lawsuits that terminate with large settlements are likely to 
result in CEO turnover. Similarly, executives that are found guilty of 
financial misrepresentation by the Security and Exchange Commission 
and the Department of Justice are almost always removed from their 
position and bear significant financial losses (Karpoff et al., 2008b). 
Security class action lawsuits increase the likelihood that the CEO will 
suffer a reduction in compensation or be laid off, and increase the 
likelihood that the firm will receive a disciplinary takeover bid 
(Humphery-Jenner, 2012). 
Outside board directors do not face abnormal turnover in firms 
involved in litigation, but they tend to lose a significant number of 
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board seats held in other firms (Fich and Shivdasani, 2007). The 
monitoring quality of boards of directors significantly improves 
following the filing of derivative lawsuits. In particular, the number of 
independent directors increases following derivative litigation (Ferris et 
al., 2007). Similarly, after being involved in a fraud case, firms take 
actions to improve their governance practices by increasing the 
number of independent directors and audit committee meetings. Both 
operating and stock performance improve after these changes (Farber, 
2005; Marciukaityte et al., 2006). The improvement in board 
independence is especially significant when institutional investors 
serve as lead plaintiff in the security class action lawsuit (Cheng et al., 
2010). 
While the evidence discussed above views litigation as an 
effective external force to improve internal governance practices, some 
studies present evidence that suggests that litigation in some cases 
can have the effect of increasing agency conflicts. Peng and Roell 
(2008) show that incentive compensation with stock options 
encourages firms to manipulate earnings during litigation class 
periods. During that time executives exercise more options and sell 
more shares. Dai et al. (2014) find that pay-for-performance 
sensitivity decreases after the announcement of a lawsuit filing, but 
reverts back to its original level after the resolution of the lawsuit. 
Gormley and Matsa (2011) find that firms with employees exposed to 
newly identified carcinogens respond to the increase in litigation risk 
by growing through diversifying acquisitions, which on average are 
associated with negative announcements returns. 
5.6 Insider trading 
Niehaus and Roth (1999) analyze a small sample of class action 
lawsuits between 1988 and 1994 and do not find abnormal insider 
trading activity during the class action period. Later studies on larger 
samples, however, do provide evidence of insider trading surrounding 
lawsuits. Griffin et al. (2004) determine that during the class action 
period net insider sales are significantly higher than that for insiders of 
matched non-sued firms. Iqbal et al. (2007) find evidence of insider 
trading prior to the filing of a lawsuit. Bradley et al. (2014) report that 
managers significantly increase their informed option exercise during 
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the class period. Overall, excluding Niehaus and Roth (1999), all 
research on litigation and insider trading provides evidence of 
managers exploiting private information around security lawsuit events 
and therefore supports the merits of security class action litigation. 
6. Litigation and the politically connected firm 
The extent to which politically connected firms benefit while in 
the process of litigation represents yet another area with implications 
for corporate finance. Correia (2014) studies SEC initiated lawsuits and 
reports that politically connected firms face less litigation risk and are 
awarded lower penalties. Firth et al. (2011) conclude that there is a 
favorable bias toward politically connected firms in the Chinese court 
system. Fulmer and Knill (2013) find that CEOs who contribute to PACs 
receive reduced penalties when prosecuted by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission or the Department of Justice. Abdulmanova 
(2016) examines federal and state political connections for a large 
sample of US firms and concludes that such influence helps to 
decrease the losses associated with federal class action litigation. 
7. Summary and directions for future research 
As noted in this survey, the issue of corporate litigation is one of 
increasing importance to the modern firm. Its importance resides in 
the fact that litigation has the ability to influence essentially every 
aspect of the firm’s operations. Indeed, we have described how 
litigation can influence equity issuance decisions, the firm’s cost of 
capital, financial reporting, and corporate governance. The 
consequence of its effect on firm value and profitability is vast. These 
effects of litigation justify its importance as a subject for academic 
study. 
The academic literature in this area is exceptionally inter-
disciplinary. The litigation area itself is organic to law, but because of 
its effect on the firm’s activities, it has expanded to include finance, 
management, accounting, and economics. Because much of the 
litigation literature focuses on an understanding of why firms are sued, 
there is also extensive work appearing in the psychology and political 
science literatures. 
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In spite of the extensive work already done in litigation, a 
number of issues remain either unaddressed or only partially 
examined. Hence, they represent an exceptionally attractive 
opportunity for future research. For instance, little work has been done 
regarding international litigation and how patterns observed in US 
corporate lawsuits differ globally. Especially interesting in this regard is 
how national culture might affect both the incidence and the outcomes 
of business litigation. 
Corporate governance determines the degree to which its 
managers are monitored and how the firm makes its strategic 
decisions. Consequently, when governance systems fail and a lawsuit 
is initiated, the firm’s directors and executives automatically become 
defendant in the suit. Thus, there are abundant research opportunities 
to investigate the influence that corporate governance structures exert 
on the decision to litigate, the resolution of that litigation and how the 
settlements are satisfied. 
Because of the magnitude of the settlements and the changes in 
corporate strategy that litigation involves, these lawsuits can exert a 
long-term effect on the value and operations of a firm. Litigation can 
effect corporate decisions about merger and acquisition, capital 
expenditures, R&D, and even dividends. The long-term financial and 
operating effects of litigation represents yet another stream of inquiry 
for future researchers. 
Litigation is often the result of investor attention and the result 
of media coverage. Recent work by Abdulmanova et al. (2016) use a 
novel measure of investor attention to explain when lawsuits are filed 
and the market’s reaction to such filings. The use of social media and 
other internet-based software to follow corporate activities represents 
yet another direction for the future study of corporate litigation. 
Notes 
1Audit analytics and litigation cost survey of major companies, US 
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, 2010. 
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2Similarly, Cornerstone Research reports an average settlement for 
security class action lawsuits of $47 million for the 1996-2014 
period. 
3Sections 12 and 10(b) similarly apply to both direct and aftermarket 
purchasers. However, damages under both these sections are 
based on the investor’s purchase price rather than the offer 
price. 
4As explained by Lowry and Shu (2002) “Under the litigation-risk 
hypothesis, initial returns can be related to the probability of a 
lawsuit along two dimensions. First, firms with higher litigation 
risk should underprice their IPOs by a greater amount as 
insurance against litigation. This implies that initial returns are 
an increasing function of litigation risk. Second, firms that buy 
more insurance against litigation, i.e., underprice more, expect 
to be sued less often. This implies that litigation is a decreasing 
function of initial returns. Because the probability of being sued 
is itself an endogenous variable that could depend on 
underpricing, a comparison of initial returns across sued and 
non-sued firms is problematic.” 
References 
Abdulmanova, A. (2016), “The value of political influence in corporate 
litigation”, working paper, University of Missouri, Columbia.  
Abdulmanova, A., Lothari, P., Ferris, S. and Jayaraman, N. (2016), “The 
effect of investor attention on the corporate litigation process”, 
working paper, University of Missouri, Columbia.  
Adhikari, B.K., Agrawal, A. and Malm, J. (2016), “Do women stay out of 
trouble? Evidence from corporate litigation”, working paper, University 
of Miami, Miami, FL.  
Agrawal, A., Jaffe, J.F. and Karpoff, J.M. (1999), “Management turnover and 
governance changes following the revelation of fraud”, The Journal of 
Law and Economics, Vol. 42 No. 1, pp. 309-342.  
Alexander, J.C. (1991), “Do the merits matter? A study of settlements in 
securities class actions”, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 43 No. 3, pp. 497-
598.  
Ali, A. and Kallapur, S. (2001), “Securities price consequences of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and related events”, The 
Accounting Review, Vol. 76 No. 3, pp. 431-460.  
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Managerial Finance, Vol 43, No. 1 (2017): pg. 4-18. DOI. This article is © Emerald and permission has been granted for 
this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald. 
20 
 
Arena, M. and Julio, B. (2015), “The effects of securities class action litigation 
on corporate liquidity and investment policy”, Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 50 Nos 1-2, pp. 251-275.  
Arena, M. and Julio, B. (2016), “Litigation risk management through payout 
policy”, working paper, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI.  
Arena, M.P. and Ferris, S.P. (2016), “Litigation risk and corporate financial 
policies around the world”, working paper, Marquette University, 
Milwaukee, WI.  
Autore, D.M., Hutton, I., Peterson, D.R. and Smith, A.H. (2014), “The effect 
of securities litigation on external financing”, Journal of Corporate 
Finance, Vol. 27, pp. 231-250.  
Bajaj, M., Caswell, N., Goel, A., Maxumdar, S.C. and Surana, R. (2014), “The 
real costs of US securities class action litigation”, US Chamber Institute 
for Legal Reform 
Baker, T. and Griffith, S.J. (2007), “Predicting corporate governance risk: 
evidence from the directors’ and officers’ liability insurance market”, 
Chicago Law Review, Vol. 74 No. 2, pp. 487-544.  
Banerjee, S., Humphery-Jenner, M., Nanda, V.K. and Tham, T.M. (2016), 
“Executive overconfidence and securities class actions”, working paper, 
University of Texas Dallas, Dallas, TX.  
Banerjee, S., Dai, L. and Shrestha, K. (2011), “Cross-country IPOs: what 
explains differences in underpricing?”, Journal of Corporate Finance, 
Vol. 17 No. 5, pp. 1289-1305.  
Becht, M., Bolton, P. and Röell, A. (2003), “Corporate governance and 
control”, in Constantinides, G.M., Harris, M. and Stulz, R.M. (Eds), 
Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Vol. 1, Part A, Elsevier, New 
York, NY, pp. 1-109.  
Bhagat, S., Bizjak, J. and Coles, J.L. (1998), “The shareholder wealth 
implications of corporate lawsuits”, Financial Management, Vol. 27 No. 
4, pp. 5-27.  
Bhagat, S., Brickley, J.A. and Coles, J.L. (1994), “The costs of inefficient 
bargaining and financial distress: evidence from corporate lawsuits”, 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 35 No. 2, pp. 221-247.  
Bhattacharya, U., Galpin, N. and Haslem, B. (2007), “The home court 
advantage in international corporate litigation”, Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol. 50 No. 4, pp. 625-660.  
Bizjak, J.M. and Coles, J.L. (1995), “The effect of private antitrust litigation on 
the stockmarket valuation of the firm”, American Economic Review, 
Vol. 85 No. 3, pp. 436-461.  
Black, B.S., Cheffins, B.R. and Klausner, M. (2006), “Outside director liability: 
a policy analysis”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 
Vol. 162 No. 1, pp. 5-20.  
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Managerial Finance, Vol 43, No. 1 (2017): pg. 4-18. DOI. This article is © Emerald and permission has been granted for 
this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald. 
21 
 
Bradley, D., Cline, B.N. and Lian, Q. (2014), “Class action lawsuits and 
executive stock option exercise”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 
27, pp. 157-172.  
Bradley, M. and Chen, D. (2011), “Corporate governance and the cost of 
debt: evidence from director limited liability and indemnification 
provisions”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 17 No. 1, pp. 83-107.  
Brown, S., Hillegeist, S.A. and Lo, K. (2005), “Management forecasts and 
litigation risk”, working paper, Sauder School of Business, University of 
British Columbia, Vancouver.  
Cao, Z. and Narayanamoorthy, G.S. (2011), “The effect of litigation risk on 
management earnings forecasts”, Contemporary Accounting Research, 
Vol. 28 No. 1, pp. 125-173.  
Cao, Z. and Narayanamoorthy, G.S. (2014), “Accounting and litigation risk: 
evidence from directors’ and officers’ insurance pricing”, Review of 
Accounting Studies, Vol. 19 No. 1, pp. 1-42.  
Chandra, U., Wasley, C.E. and Waymire, G.B. (2004), “Income conservatism 
in the US Technology sector”, working paper, Simon Business School, 
University of Rochester, Rochester, NY.  
Chava, S., Agnes Cheng, C.S., Huang, H. and Lobo, G.J. (2010), “Implications 
of securities class actions for cost of equity capital”, International 
Journal of Law and Management, Vol. 52 No. 2, pp. 144-161.  
Cheng, C.A., Huang, H.H., Li, Y. and Lobo, G. (2010), “Institutional 
monitoring through shareholder litigation”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 95 No. 3, pp. 356-383.  
Choi, S. (2006), “Do the merits matter less after the private securities 
litigation reform act?”, The Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization, Vol. 23 No. 3, pp. 598-626.  
Correia, M. (2014), “Political connections and SEC enforcement”, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 57 Nos 2-3, pp. 241-262.  
Cox, J.D. and Thomas, R.S. (2004), “Public and private enforcement of the 
securities laws: have things changed since enron?”, Notre Dame Law 
Review, Vol. 80 No. 3, pp. 893-907. 
Cutler, D.M. and Summers, L.H. (1988), “The costs of conflict resolution and 
financial distress: evidence from the Texaco-Pennzoil litigation”, The 
Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 19 No. 2, pp. 157-172.  
Dai, Z., Jin, L. and Zhang, W. (2014), “Executive pay – performance 
sensitivity and litigation”, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 31 
No. 1, pp. 152-177.  
Daines, R., Gow, I. and Larcker, D. (2010), “Rating the ratings: how good are 
commercial corporate governance ratings?”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 98 No. 3, pp. 439-461.  
Dechow, P.M., Sloan, R.G. and Sweeney, A.P. (1996), “Causes and 
consequences of earnings manipulation: an analysis of firms subject to 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Managerial Finance, Vol 43, No. 1 (2017): pg. 4-18. DOI. This article is © Emerald and permission has been granted for 
this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald. 
22 
 
enforcement actions by the SEC”, Contemporary Accounting Research, 
Vol. 13 No. 1, pp. 1-36.  
Deng, S., Willis, R.H. and Xu, L. (2014), “Shareholder litigation, reputational 
loss, and bank loan contracting”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, Vol. 49 No. 4, pp. 1101-1132.  
Donelson, D.C., McInnis, J.M., Mergenthaler, R.D. and Yu, Y. (2012), “The 
timeliness of bad earnings news and litigation risk”, The Accounting 
Review, Vol. 87 No. 6, pp. 1967-1991.  
Drake, P.D. and Vetsuypens, M.R. (1993), “IPO underpricing and insurance 
against legal liability”, Financial Management, Vol. 22 No. 1, pp. 64-
73.  
DuCharme, L.L., Malatesta, P.H. and Sefcik, S.E. (2004), “Earnings 
management, stock issues, and shareholder lawsuits”, Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 71 No. 1, pp. 27-49.  
Dyl, E.A. (1999), “Estimating economic damages in class action securities 
fraud litigation”, Journal of Forensic Economics, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 1-
11.  
Ellert, J.C. (1976), “Mergers, antitrust law enforcement and stockholder 
returns”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 31 No. 2, pp. 715-732.  
Engelmann, K. and Cornell, B. (1988), “Measuring the cost of corporate 
litigation: five case studies”, The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 17 No. 
2, pp. 377-399. 
Farber, D.B. (2005), “Restoring trust after fraud: does corporate governance 
matter?”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 80 No. 2, pp. 539-561.  
Ferris, S., Hao, G. and Liao, M. (2013), “The effect of issuer conservatism on 
IPO pricing and performance”, Review of Finance, Vol. 17 No. 3, pp. 
993-1027. 
Ferris, S.P. and Pritchard, A.C. (2001), “Stock price reactions to securities 
fraud class actions under the private securities litigation reform act”, 
Michigan Law and Economics Research Paper, No. 01-009, University 
of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.  
Ferris, S.P., Jandik, T., Lawless, R.M. and Makhija, A. (2007), “Derivative 
lawsuits as a corporate governance mechanism: empirical evidence on 
board changes surrounding filings”, Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 42 No. 1, pp. 143-165 
Fich, E.M. and Shivdasani, A. (2007), “Financial fraud, director reputation, 
and shareholder wealth”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 86 No. 2, 
pp. 306-336.  
Field, L., Lowry, M. and Shu, S. (2005), “Does disclosure deter or trigger 
litigation?”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 39 No. 3, pp. 
487-507.  
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Managerial Finance, Vol 43, No. 1 (2017): pg. 4-18. DOI. This article is © Emerald and permission has been granted for 
this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald. 
23 
 
Firth, M., Rui, O. and Wu, W. (2011), “The effects of political connections and 
state ownership on corporate litigation in China”, The Journal of Law 
and Economics, Vol. 54 No. 3, pp. 573-607.  
Fischel, D.R. and Bradley, M. (1986), “Role of liability rules and the derivative 
suit in corporate law: a theoretical and empirical analysis”, Cornell Law 
Review, Vol. 71 No. 2, pp. 261-298.  
Francis, J., Philbrick, D. and Schipper, K. (1994a), “Determinants and 
outcomes in class action securities litigation”, working paper, 
University of Chicago, Chicago, IL.  
Francis, J., Philbrick, D. and Schipper, K. (1994b), “Shareholder litigation and 
corporate disclosures”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 32 No. 2, 
pp. 137-164.  
Fulmer, S. and Knill, A.M. (2013), “Political contributions and the severity of 
government enforcement”, working paper, Florida State University, 
Tallahassee.  
Gande, A. and Lewis, C.M. (2009), “Shareholder-initiated class action 
lawsuits: shareholder wealth effects and industry spillovers”, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 44 No. 4, pp. 823-850.  
Gormley, T.A. and Matsa, D.A. (2011), “Growing out of trouble? Corporate 
responses to liability risk”, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 24 No. 8, 
pp. 2781-2821.  
Griffin, P.A., Grundfest, J.A. and Perino, M.A. (2004), “Stock price response to 
news of securities fraud litigation: an analysis of sequential and 
conditional information”, Abacus, Vol. 40 No. 1, pp. 21-48.  
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995”, Stanford University, Stanford, 
CA.  
Hanley, K.W. and Hoberg, G. (2012), “Litigation risk, strategic disclosure and 
the underpricing of initial public offerings”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 103 No. 2, pp. 235-254.  
Hao, Q. (2011), “Securities litigation, withdrawal risk and initial public 
offerings”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 17 No. 3, pp. 438-456.  
Helland, E. (2006), “Reputational penalties and the merits of class‐action 
securities litigation”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 49 No. 2, pp. 
365-395.  
Hensler, D.A. (1995), “Litigation costs and the underpricing of initial public 
offerings”, Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 16 No. 2, pp. 111-
128.  
Hughes, P.J. and Thakor, A.V. (1992), “Litigation risk, intermediation, and the 
underpricing of initial public offerings”, Review of Financial Studies, 
Vol. 5 No. 4, pp. 709-742.  
Humphery-Jenner, M.L. (2012), “Internal and external discipline following 
securities class actions”, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 21 
No. 1, pp. 151-179.  
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Managerial Finance, Vol 43, No. 1 (2017): pg. 4-18. DOI. This article is © Emerald and permission has been granted for 
this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald. 
24 
 
Hutton, I., Jiang, D. and Kumar, A. (2015), “Political values, culture, and 
corporate litigation”, Management Science, Vol. 61 No. 12, pp. 2905-
2925 
Ibbotson, R.G. (1975), “Price performance of common stock new issues”, 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 2 No. 3, pp. 235-272.  
Iqbal, Z., Shetty, S. and Wang, K. (2007), “Further evidence on insider 
trading and the merits of securities class actions”, Journal of Financial 
Research, Vol. 30 No. 4, pp. 533-545.  
Jarrell, G. and Peltzman, S. (1985), “The impact of product recalls on the 
wealth of sellers”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 93 No. 3, pp. 512-
536 
Johnson, M.F., Kasznik, R. and Nelson, K.K. (2000a), “Shareholder wealth 
effects of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995”, Review 
of Accounting Studies, Vol. 5 No. 3, pp. 217-233 
Johnson, M.F., Kasznik, R. and Nelson, K.K. (2001), “The impact of securities 
litigation reform on the disclosure of forward‐looking information by 
high technology firms”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 39 No. 2, 
pp. 297-327.  
Jonson, M.F., Nelson, K.K. and Pritchard, A.C. (2000b), “In re silicon graphics 
securities litigation: shareholder wealth effects of the interpretation of 
the private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s pleading standard”, 
Southern California Law Review, Vol. 73 No. 4, pp. 773-810.  
Johnson, M.F., Nelson, K.K. and Pritchard, A.C. (2007), “Do the merits matter 
more? The impact of the private securities litigation reform Act”, 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 23 No. 3, pp. 627-
652.  
Jones, C.L. and Weingram, S.E. (1996), “The determinants of 10b-5 litigation 
risk”, George Washington University, Washington, DC.  
Karpoff, J. and Lott, J. (1999), “On the determinants and importance of 
punitive damage awards”, The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 42 
No. S1, pp. 527-573.  
Karpoff, J., Lee, D. and Martin, G. (2008a), “The cost to firms of cooking the 
books”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 43 No. 3, 
pp. 581-612. 
Karpoff, J.M. and Lott, J.R. (1993), “The reputational penalty firms bear from 
committing criminal fraud”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 36 No. 
2, pp. 757-802 
Karpoff, J.M., Lee, D.S. and Martin, G.S. (2008b), “The consequences to 
managers for financial misrepresentation”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 88 No. 2, pp. 193-215.  
Keloharju, M. (1993), “The winner’s curse, legal liability, and the long-run 
price performance of initial public offerings in Finland”, Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 34 No. 2, pp. 251-277.  
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Managerial Finance, Vol 43, No. 1 (2017): pg. 4-18. DOI. This article is © Emerald and permission has been granted for 
this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald. 
25 
 
Kim, I. and Skinner, D.J. (2012), “Measuring securities litigation risk”, Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 53 No. 1, pp. 290-310.  
Klein, B. and Leffler, K.B. (1981), “The role of market forces in assuring 
contractual performance”, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89 
No. 4, pp. 615-641. 
Klock, M. (2015), “Do class action filings affect stock prices? The stock market 
reaction to securities class actions post PSLRA”, Journal of Business 
and Securities Law, Vol. 15 No. 1, pp. 109-219.  
Landes, W.M. and Posner, R.A. (1987), “Trademark law: an economic 
perspective”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 30 No. 2, pp. 265-
309.  
Lin, H.L., Pukthuanthong, K. and Walker, T.J. (2013), “An international look 
at the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis of IPO underpricing”, Journal of 
Corporate Finance, Vol. 19, pp. 56-77.  
Lowry, M. and Shu, S. (2002), “Litigation risk and IPO underpricing”, Journal 
of Financial Economics, Vol. 65 No. 3, pp. 309-335.  
McTier, B.C. and Wald, J.K. (2011), “The causes and consequences of 
securities class action litigation”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 17 
No. 3, pp. 649-665.  
Marciukaityte, D., Szewczyk, S.H., Uzun, H. and Varma, R. (2006), 
“Governance and performance changes after accusations of corporate 
fraud”, Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 62 No. 3, pp. 32-41. 
Murphy, D.L., Shrieves, R.E. and Tibbs, S.L. (2009), “Understanding the 
penalties associated with corporate misconduct: an empirical 
examination of earnings and risk”, Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 44 No. 1, pp. 55-83.  
Niehaus, G. and Roth, G. (1999), “Insider trading, equity issues, and CEO 
turnover in firms subject to securities class action”, Financial 
Management, Vol. 28 No. 4, pp. 52-72.  
Peltzman, S. (1981), “The effects of FTC advertising regulation”, The 
American Economic Review, Vol. 24 No. 3, pp. 403-448.  
Peng, L. and Röell, A. (2008), “Manipulation and equity-based compensation”, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 98 No. 2, pp. 285-290.  
Perino, M.A. (2003), “Did the private securities litigation reform act work?”, 
University of Illinois Law Review, Vol. 2003 No. 4, pp. 913-978.  
Phillips, R.M. and Miller, G.C. (1996), “The Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995: rebalancing litigation risks and rewards for class action 
plaintiffs, defendants and lawyers”, The Business Lawyer, Vol. 51 No. 
4, pp. 1009-1069 
Rogers, J.L. and Stocken, P.C. (2005), “Credibility of management forecasts”, 
The Accounting Review, Vol. 80 No. 4, pp. 1233-1260.  
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Managerial Finance, Vol 43, No. 1 (2017): pg. 4-18. DOI. This article is © Emerald and permission has been granted for 
this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald. 
26 
 
Rogers, J.L. and Van Buskirk, A. (2009), “Shareholder litigation and changes 
in disclosure behaviour”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 47 
No. 1, pp. 136-156.  
Rogers, J.L., Van Buskirk, A. and Zechman, S.L. (2011), “Disclosure tone and 
shareholder litigation”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 86 No. 6, pp. 
2155-2183.  
Romano, R. (1991), “The shareholder suit: litigation without foundation?”, 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 55-87.  
Simmons, R.W. and Hoyt, R.C. (1993), “Economic damage analysis in rule 
10b-5 securities litigations”, Journal of Legal Economics, Vol. 3 No. 1, 
pp. 71-87.  
Skinner, D.J. (1994), “Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news”, Journal of 
Accounting Research, Vol. 32 No. 1, pp. 38-60. 
Skinner, D.J. (1997), “Earnings disclosures and stockholder lawsuits”, Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 23 No. 3, pp. 249-282.  
Tinic, S.M. (1988), “Anatomy of initial public offerings of common stock”, The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 43 No. 4, pp. 789-822. 
Walker, T., Turtle, H.J., Pukthuanthong, K. and Thiengtham, D. (2015), “Legal 
opportunism, litigation risk, and IPO underpricing”, Journal of Business 
Research, Vol. 68 No. 2, pp. 326-340.  
Yuan, Q. and Zhang, Y. (2015), “Do banks price litigation risk in debt 
contracting? Evidence from class action lawsuits”, Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting, Vol. 42 Nos 9-10, pp. 1310-1340.  
Zhu, Y.E. (2009), “The relation between IPO underpricing and litigation risk 
revisited: changes between 1990 and 2002”, Financial Management, 
Vol. 38 No. 2, pp. 323-355.  
Zingales, L. (2007), “Is the US capital market losing its competitive edge?”, 
ECGI-Finance working paper, European Corporate Governance 
Institute, No. 192/1997, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL.  
 
